The collapse of the Sovieı Union has changed international system and put the newly independent slaıes of the Caucasus finnly into geopolitical calculations, which prompted disagreemenıs, hostility, and possible armed interventions. In this context, this paper identifies the sources of unrest and threats to the stability of the Black Sea-Caucasus region. First, domestic sources of conflicts in the area, such as ethnic diversity, religious differenees, economic inequaIity, and tOlalitarianism are explored. Seeondly, the influenee and foreign policies of number of countries active in the region are analysed, devoting particular attenıion to the attempts and inability of Russia to reconsolidate its power and hegemony. Third, the legal quandary over the definition of the Caspian Sea's slalus and the controversy surrounding the issue of transporting its natural resources out of the region are explored. The environmentaI issues in connection with the oil exploration activities in the Caspian Sea is also takcn up. Finally, mechanisms for diffusing at least some of the controversies and threats are discussed within the context of the prospects awaiting the region in the mid-to-Iong tenn.
The changes experieneed in international politics since ı989 have significantly altered the geopolitics of Eurasia, and the sudden emergence of the newly independent states (NIS) in place of former Soviet Union caught the world at large unprepared. The fact that no major empire has dissolved in this century without their successor states undergoing civil wars or regional conflicts made the occasion more dramatic.
During most of the twentieth century, the strategists and geopolitical experts eonsidered the lands beyond the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea as Soviet Union's hinterland. The other superpower (Le., the United States) simply tried to "contain" these areas by linking its various alignment systems. Thus, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan beeame important outposts of this policy, white Korea and Vietnam beeame its banleground, and China was useCuI in the chain insofar as it quarrelled with the Soviet Union.
However, the eollapse of the Soviet Union has changed this situation dramaticaIly, putting the NIS of greater Caspian region firmly into geopolitieal ealculations. ı This is both because it was discovered that some of them sit on vast natural resources, notably oil and gas, and beeause some of them were immediately engulfed in what was described as ethnic confliets. Even in those countries that so far have avoided umest and eonfliets, the competition between various outside powers for influence threatened widespread disagreements, hostility and possibly armed interventions.
Moreover, during the Cold War, the world's attention, preoccupied by the possible results of a nuclear confrontation between the two bloes, had naturally focused on the global balance of power and stratcgie stability. Today, on the other hand, as there is no longer a superpower rivalry, world attention has turned towards the unfolding complexities of ethnic-based regional conflicts.
lFor a defilion of the "Greaıer Caspian" see M. Aydın, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of InseabiUty and Predicament, Ankara, Cenıer for Straıegic Research, 2000, pp. 10-13. In this context, it is worth mentioning that out of 28 wars fought in 1999 throughout the world, 19 were intra-state wars and at least 15 of them involved secession demands. What is more important for our purpose is four of these wars (NagomoKarabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechnya -five if we eount 1994-1996 and Russia's current Chechen imbrogIio as two separate wars) were fought in the Caucasus area, making the region one of the hot spots of the world. All of the se were for seeession and three of them (Nagomo-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) have become protracted frozen conOicts, where exchanges of fire maystart at any given moment.
As there are many more possibilities for conflict in the region, the purpose of this paper is [jrst to identify the sources of unrest and possible threats to the future stability of this region, and the n speculate about the mechanisms for diffusing at least some of the eontroversies within the context of mid-to-long-term prospeet of the region. The GUUAM and other proposed regional organizations would come into the discussion at this point.
We can project a number of interrelated and overlapping levels of threat to security and stability in the region, emanating from both within and withouı.
First of all, we have to mention domestic sources of conflicts in the area, such as ethnic diversity, religious differenecs, economic inequality and less than fuIIy democratic govemance throughout the region.
In addition to the challenges of economic and political transition, Caucasian states, arter declaıing independence, have had to contend with populations searching for and developing a sense of national identity. Thus, from the [jrst day of their independence, they had faced the all-imposing task of the necessity to replace the now "discredited" socialist ideologyand the social and eeonomic model based upon it with a new thinking that could also help the m to define their scpara te "identities".
Although three union republics were formed in the Caucasus, the Soviet period contributed little lO support national idemities. The borders of these states did not create homogeneous repubIies. Rather, they divided people. The end result was a poisonous mixture of various local, tribal and ethnic groups. Even a casual look today at the ethnic overlap within the region as well as the artificial nature of the boundaries c1early indicates to potential crises based on nationality questions. During the Soviet era, the destabilising effects of ethnic and religious diversity were kept under control by strict authoritarian control and suppression. However, the root causes of instabmty were never dealt with, which eventually contributed to the region's turmoil as the forces of destruction were unleashed following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Although each independent Transcaucasian state has its own dominant titular nation, each also has significant number of minorities.
The More complicated then this is the existing situation in the North Caucasus.
With its nincteen native national groups, recognised by the last Soviet census of 1989, and a significant ethnic Russian Diaspora as well as non-titular populations of Cossacksı Nogai, and number of oLhers. the North Caucasus is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse regions of the world. The situation in the North Caucasus has bcen complicated further by the sharing of the same territory by several minorities and more than one titular nationality. In co nt rast, Dagestan is distinguished by its lack of titular national groups, and incorporates ten non-titular national groups that are recognised officially as "Pcopies of Dagestan". Obviously, all of the North Caucasian "nationalities" is prone to instability and conflict in the future.
Another hotly discussed aspect of the identity question is the role of religion, and especially the rising fears about the influence of radical Islam in the region. It is obvious today that the long periods of Russian imperial rule and atheistic Soviet-era indoctrination have failed to eliminate the influence of Islam in the region as an important element of individual and collective selfidentity.
There is of course a danger in the North Caucasus that radical Islam could grow as a resull of the unpredictable changes, disillusioned hopes, economic deprivation and lack of employment opportunities. Preventing an upsurge in Islamic militancy and the emergence of Islamic-oriented governments was sometimes daimed as a primary objective of both Russia and the West in the Caucasus. Consequently, it was this concem that promoted the socalled Turkish model of development superior to the Iranian model, representing the Islamic altemative. Later on, same concem led some Western analysts to view reassertion of Russian power as the lesser devi!. On the other hand, Russia, too, used the same pretext to retain its military forces in the region.
Though religious fanaticism could turn out to be a dangerous factor in the fu ture , especially as an ideological vehicle to mobilise the masses, it has not be en a significant source of conflict so far throughout the Caucasus. No doubt, the post-Soviet search for historical roots and identity has led to growing interest in Islam. But, political Islam, as opposed to a purely cullural interest in the religion, has yet to make a significant mark. Thus, excepting the Chechens, Islam, at present, does not play an important political role with most of the Caucasian nationalities, and it could be argued that a union of all the MosIem peoples of the North Caucasus within a single Islamic state is utopian, and the prospect for establishing an Islamic republic along the lines of Iran in the region is weak.
Other domestic sources of instability are related to the economic conditions exist in the region. The Caspian region offers tremendous economic opportunities in the post-Soviet world. However, possible uneven development patterns are a significant [YOL. XXX potential source of instability in the region. Differences in the natural resource bases could provoke economically driven migration, polarise ethnic groups, and cause increased tensions. This combined with widespread unemployment creates potential for conflict.
it is also worth considering what effect the anticipated wealth resulting from these natural resources will have on the regional problems and the potential for confrontation. There are concems, for example, that countries gaining most from the exploitation of natural resources mighL use Lheir newly gained wealth to increase their military spending, Lhus creaLing a destabilising change in the regional balance of power.
On the other hand, the rapid economic and social changes since the collapse of Lhe SovieL Union have left many people with a much lower standard of living Lhan Lhey previously had, and wiLhout the social safeLy net Lhat Lhey had benefiLed under the Soviet regime. These rapid changes and economic pressures have aıready led to a marked increase in personal corruption with its negative impact on regional stabiliLy. Since the independence, bribery and other corrupt practices offered a way for people to supplement their incomes in Lhe unstable economic environments.
AnoLher aspect of economic underdevelopment throughout the region is the sLrong desire to exploit the region's reaches as soan as possibIc. However, Lhe end resulL of this hasty development effort might be the ruin of Lhe Caspian's unique ecosystem accompanied by an irreversible environmental catastrophe.
Still wiLhin the domestic sources of instability, we have to mentian the role of political ideology that has replaced communism in the region, that is aULhoriLarianism. All the regional Icaders have concluded thaL, given prescnL conditions in their countries, a period of aULhoriLarian rule is a necessary stage in the transiLion from communist tOLaliLarianism Lo liberal democracy. Thus, while the struggle for naLional identification goes on within each republic, authoriıaıianism provides a tempıing solution as "the only way to keep Lhe counLry Logeıher". However, this may be a source of long-term ırouble as iL pULSa lid on boiling problems, preventing ventilation and possibly causing violent eruptions in the longer term.
Secondly, we have to discuss the influence and foreign policies of a extra-regional countries active in the region, devoting particular attention to the attempts and inability of Russia to reconsolidate its power and hegemony.
The initial power vacuum created in the region by the collapse of the Soviet Union has attracted many regional states and extemal powers into a dangerous game. Among the countries envisioned as key players the Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran, the United States, and the European Union, appear more active in the region. Obviously, each country has specific objectives, and the competition has economic, political, ideological and religious dimensions. As such, there exist various potentials for conflict among regional rivals.
While Russia initially welcomed Turkish influence in the region as a counterwcight against Iranian dominated pan-Islamism, these views by now have shiftcd, and became itself more aggressive in asserting its "rights in its near abroad". In this move po litical , economic and miIitary pressures have bccn used extensively, even arguing that stability in the region would be threatened without a Russian presence.
On the other hand, Turkeyand Iran bccame rivals trying to create spheres of infiucnce. Thus. for a while a competition emerged bctween two opposing models of political development for the Turco-Moslem peoplcs of the region: the secular model of Turkey with political pluralism and the Jslamic model supported by Iran. In the meantime, Russian-Iranian relations rapidly developed after initial suspicions and reaehed an all-time high, with Iran becoming not only an important trading partner and profitable arms customer, but also an important exponent of Moscow's interests in the region and a eounter against the growing influence of the United States.
What is presently more imponant on a more generallevel,we are witnessing the emergenee of two "val groups or loosely defined political allianees in the region. There are the Russian Federation, Armenia and Iran on the one side, and the United States, Azerbaijan. Georgia and Turkey on the other. The long-tenn impIications of this kind of confrontation are too obvious to warrant a further discussion here.
We also have to mention that it is the constant Russian manoeuvring in the Caucasus that has been the most important destabilising factor. Russia wishes to keep its hold over the area, but its own serious economic problems and political weaknesses hampers its efforts to restore its hegemony. Thus, while Russia is very sensitive to growing foreign presence and influence in the region and tries to curb both, İls influence continue s to decIine. Therefore, despite dire consequences, there flew contradictory and uncoordinated actions towards the region from Russia. This creates an ambiguous and uncertain situation throughout the region and makes it all the more difficult for others to come to terms with the regional realities.
Third, the legal quandary over the definition of the Caspian Sea's status and the controversy surrounding the issue of transporting natural resources out of the region have to be explored.
In this context, the serious questions conceming environmental and ecological issues arising from oil exploration activities in the Caspian Sea also need to be elucidated.
The attention of the wider international community turned to the region because of its rich natural resourees. Therefore, international competition for access to oil and gas reserves and the need to bring them to world markets had both positive and negative effects on regional eonmets. Obviously, the full potential of regional wealth can only be enjoyed widely if its energy resources have a stable access to international markets. This motivates regional states LO co-operate and provides an incentive for international efforts to resolve the region's conmcts. At the same time, however, the competition among the countries wishing to host the pipelines out of the region creates possibilities for conmcts.
During the Soviet period, most of the Caspian Sea coastline, apart from a smail Iranian portion on the South, belonged to the Soviet Union. Sinee the collapse of the Soviet Union, five states have shared the coastline and claimed further authority over parts of the Sea area. Although it is not difficult to see the urgent necd for an explicit definition of the legal status of Caspian, the ongoing discussion among the riparian states has tended to perpetuate over the issue of the sea/lake controversy while the real problem appears to be that of sharing the profil. Obviously, the undetermined status of the Caspian Sea not only prevents potential eamings of regional countries from foreign direct investments for exploitation and transportation of the hydrocarbon deposits under the Caspian seabed, but it also creates an unstable and explosive regional system.
Another peculiar fealure of the Caspian oil is the fact that the countries that are most interested in early exploration and transportation of the oil and nalural gas are landlocked and have to rely on co-operation of their neighbours. As each country has its preference regarding how the oil and natural gas should be transported to the world markets, and extemal powers are trying to exert influence to ensure that selected routes best meet their needs, this issue assumes an importance quite separate from that of production.
Under the current geopolitical calculations, Russia is keenly interested in retaining, or recovering, its political influence over the Caspian Basin. In order to acquire this leverage, Russia insisted that the Northem line from Baku, Azerbaijan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk should be the main transit route for the future oil from the Caspian as this would ensure Moscow's exclusive and strategic controlover the region's rcsources. Opposing Russia's insistence on the Northem route, the United States and Turkey, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, prefer the Westem route through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. AILhough there have been various projects, the main compeıition appears to be between the Northem and Westem routes. What is at stake are not only oil and gas transit revenues that countries can extract from the pipelines passing through their respective territories, but more importantly, the pipeline network is considered as one of the key factors of securing and maintaining influence throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus. Hence, there is inercasing scope for major clashes of interests in the region, particularly intensified after the arrival of extra-regional players.
[VOL. XXX The US support for the Westem route is finnly embedded in its wider Eurasian and Middle Eastem strategic priorities. One of them is to prop up the independence of the newly independent countries of Central Asiaand the Caucasus against the influence of Russia. Anather strategic goal of the US is to exclude Iran from participation in the production of Caspian oil and gas, and to prevent the development of transportation routes or pipelines that would lead from the Caspian region to either the Persian Oulf or the Indian Ocean via Iran. This objective is obviously connected with the fundamental US strategy in the Middle East of not permitting the emergence of any dominant regional power capable of influencing the oil market in the Oulr. Marcover, the US prefers the Turkish option, because this route passes through proAmerican countries in the region and would bind them closer to each other and to Western interests. which could check the influcnces of Iran and Russia in the region.
Obviously. if the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is bu Bt and put into operation, it would weaken the economic and transport dependence of Central Asian and Caucasian states on Russia. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan would emerge as new competitors for Russia's exports of oil and gas to the world market, and would use these eamings to enhance their political independence from Russia. The role of the Westem states. whose oil and gas companies would eventual1y provide necessary investments, will increase, as will the role of Turkey. On the other hand. the perceived decrease in Russian influence or outside attempts to isoIate or eliminate Russia in the Caspian Region can casi1y become counterproductive, and may quickly encounter an asymmetric response potential1y destructive LO the stability of regional security.
Finally, let us look at same of the possibilities for regional cooperation and the ways to diffuse the conflict potential in the region.
One way 10 help cultivate stability is to encourage regional interactions and co-operation. One of the emerging examples of co-operation within the region. with links to the outside world as well. is the establishment of TRACECA (TRAnsport Corridor Europe C aucasus A sia). it is hopcd that this European Unionfund ed project will enhance regional stability by facilitating the regional exchange of goods and creating a land-based link between Europe and the region.
But, one of the more effectiye ways to deal with regional security problem s would of couese be an arrangement for a regionwide comman security organisatian along the line s of the OSCE, with maybe astanding peacekeeping force from the regional states. However, there are various obstacles to overcome hefore such an arrangement can be applied to the region. First, there is the probable Russian resistance to sharing its much-sought role of "peacemaker" for the region. Second, it would be difficult to find regional states that would send and pay the costs of its soldiers in rather far away parts of Central Asia or the Caucasus to make or keep peace in conflicts that pose little immediate danger to their interests.
Third, and maybe most importantly, the regional countries, both the older and newer ones, are not known for their co-operative tendencies, and ıhey look at each other taday with suspicion about intentions. So, almost none of the pre-conditions for setting up a regional common security organisation and conf1ict prevention mechanism exist within the region.
With this background, the outlook is not so bright and there are number of flash points that may erupt into an open armed conflict at any given ıime. Despiıe this, existing framework of political and economic cooperaıion systems in the region have not be en adequate so far to promoıe peace and stability.
One of the reasons for faHure of the existing cooperation aims in the region is their exclusive character, that is same countries are considered as potential members while others are excluded. The ECO and GUUAM are just two examples of this kind of organisations.
Moreover, in both cases, the openly economic purpose of the organisations is mixed with extraeconomical aims that come into conl1ict with economic logic. Other existing organisaıions in the region like the CIS or the BSEC alsa mix political aims with economics. Moreover, most of their members only have arather vague idea about the common interests of the se organisations. Furıhermore, some ör these organisations are dominated by the interest of one or another member, which again impair the chances of the organisation in the long ron. Therefore, in order to encourage economic cooperation and regional development, a more or less strict separation between [VOL. XXX organisations oriented towards the security and political cooperation and economic cooperation should be realized.
Anather major problem facing the existing organisations in the region is the ernergence of sub-national political entities, such as Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abhazia, and South Ossctia, whose dernands for independence creates problem s for the peaceful development of the region. Moreover, the question of how to integrate and create a cooperative atmasphere between national and sub-national enlilies within an international or supranational organisation presents an important dilernma for international law. Therefore, berore political and economic cooperation is achieved, iı is necessary to recognise this problem and find an innovative way lO harmonise the often-contradictory wishes of the nationostates and sub-naıional entities in the region.
Finally, the expectation that any organisatian established in the region could address security issues and connict resolutian as well as providing adequate basis for economic cooperation and democratic reforms is elusive and hard to realise. it is a conventionally accepted wisdom that too much and widely formulated expectations from internationalorganizations usually bring their end and failure.
Since the dissolution of lhe Soviet Union, several ideas for establishing international cooperati ve organisations in the Black Sea and Caspian Region were proposed. One of these proposals is the Caucasian Stability Pact, put forward by the then Turkish President Süleyman Demirel while visiting Tbilisi in 14-15 January this year (2000) . The overwhelmingly positive answer he received both from regional countries and also from the world's leading countries, show that lhe need to establish such a cooperation arrangement in lhe region is now widely recognised. What is now required is to agree on the concrele form and the number of rnembers.
Given
above-mentioned problems wİlh exıstıng organisations, it is imperative that the aims as well as composition of such an organisaıion for regional cooperation have to be well defincd and agrecd on in advance. To separate political from economic goals for such an organisaıion, at least in the formatiye years, would a logical choice. Moreover, aiming for an inclusive membership as much as possible instead of disparate membership, that many proposals for regional cooperation so far appears to favour, should be the chosen route. Finally, such an organisation could utilize the previous experiences of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, instead of trying to develop new organisational and legal framework from scratch. The OSCE has already developed a functioning administration and a working set of regulations that have to be adjusted for regional use.
Logical result of above causations is to establish two parallel organisations, i.e., Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Eurasia for conflict resolution and political cooperation and Organisation for Economic Cooperation in Eurasia with economic aims, both includingall the regional countries and closely cooperating with eachother. In this way, we may hope to bring peace and stability to this turbulcnt region.
